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growth in all our countries. I especially want to
highlight my unease with using the term
“imbalances” to characterize the current situa-
tion. That term almost begs for a policy response—
how can policymakers allow imbalances to
persist? Unfortunately, policy responses could
well involve damaging protectionist measures.
I will argue that, to a large extent, the current
situation is not fundamentally an imbalance but
rather a condition that is conducive to coping
with the major demographic changes that are
occurring throughout the world.
Before proceeding, I offer the standard
Federal Reserve disclaimer. The views expressed
are mine and do not necessarily reflect official
positions of the Federal Reserve System. I appre-
ciate comments provided by my colleagues at
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Cletus C.
Coughlin, vice president in the Research Division,
provided special assistance. However, I am
responsible for any errors.
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES:
FACTS AND EXPLANATIONS
Large and persistent current account sur-
pluses and deficits are common in the global
economy today, as illustrated in Figure 1. Since
early 1998, the U.S. current account has trended
downward, a fact that has attracted much atten-
tion not only in the United States but also through-
out the world. As a share of U.S. GDP, the U.S.
current account deficit has increased from roughly
I
am very pleased to have the opportunity
to be involved in today’s discussion. I
know that the American European
Community Association plays an impor-
tant role in improving international understand-
ing by organizing discussions on numerous
issues that are of importance to both American
and European audiences.
The world economy is characterized by three
highly unusual conditions. First, the capital flow
into the United States from the rest of the world
and accompanying rest-of-world current account
surplus—the U.S. current account deficit—is very
large and persistent. Second, the U.S. personal
saving rate has been falling and past year became
negative for the first time since 1933. Third, high-
income countries are just now beginning a demo-
graphic transition in which the fraction of retired
persons in the total population will rise to levels
never before experienced. The idea I will explore
with you is that these three conditions are con-
nected; the first two, I believe, are to a consider-
able extent a consequence of the third.
Today’s topic on the connection between
demographic changes and trade balances certainly
is important. My analysis combines demographic
and economics facts with economic theory to
provide some insights into the connections
between demographic changes and international
trade. I hope that my comments will contribute
at least in some small measure to increasing inter-
national understanding, especially given the
critical importance of an open international
trading system to improvements in economic2 percent to a level exceeding 6.5 percent in 2006.
Prior to recent developments, since 1960 the
largest U.S. current account deficit was nearly
3.5 percent during the mid-1980s, thought at the
time to be unusually large. It is clear that today’s
U.S. current account deficit substantially exceeds
any other such deficits during the second half of
the last century.
The United States, however, is not the only
country with a current account deficit that is a
relatively large share of its gross domestic prod-
uct. In fact, certain European nations fit such a
description. Figure 2 of the handout shows this
ratio for the European Union and for selected
European countries, some of which have current
account deficits relative to GDP larger than the
United States. For example, both Spain and
Portugal have current account deficits that are
close to 10 percent of GDP.
Given the logic of balance of payments
accounting, the current account deficits of coun-
tries such as the United States, Spain, and Portugal
must be offset by current account surpluses in
the rest of the world. One observation is that the
timing of the increase in the U.S. current account
deficit roughly coincides with an increase in the
current account position of developing countries
as a group, with developing countries in Asia
being an especially noteworthy subset. This fact
is shown in Figure 1.
Not surprisingly, the large changes in current
account balances have attracted much interest
from researchers. Economic theory can be used
to identify various factors that affect international
capital flows. Potential explanations for a world
economy in which some countries exhibit large
current account surpluses and others exhibit large
current account deficits abound. For example,
Joseph Gruber and Steven Kamin (2005) identified
seven explanations for the increasing U.S. current
account deficit and the increasing surpluses of
East Asian economies. Time constraints preclude
more than a cryptic identification of the explana-
tions. These explanations highlight the following:
1) the increase of the U.S. fiscal deficit; 2) the
decline in the U.S. private saving rate; 3) the U.S.
productivity surge; 4) the increase in global finan-
cial intermediation; 5) the global saving glut and
emerging markets financial crises, which is an
explanation closely associated with Fed Chairman
Ben Bernanke; 6) exchange rate intervention by
specific Asian countries; and 7) increasing oil
prices. Undoubtedly, some of these explanations
are relevant for understanding the current global
pattern of current account imbalances.
In a recent paper Olivier Blanchard (2007)
argues that an explanation for the U.S. deficit
and the corresponding foreign surpluses requires
a combination of many of the preceding explana-
tions. Specifically, he argues that low U.S. sav-
ing—private as well as public—is one key factor.
Another is high foreign saving—particularly in
Asia. A third is low investment in a number of
countries in both Europe and Asia. The fourth
key factor is strong investor preference for U.S.
assets relative to those of other countries.
Blanchard’s argument is supported by informa-
tion such as that contained in Ben Bernanke’s
2005 speech discussing the global saving glut
and by data on the U.S. current account balance
by geographic regions.
Table 1A contains data on current account
balances throughout the world for 1996, 2000,
2004 and 2005. A comparison of 1996 with 2005
highlights some important developments. First,
the current account position of industrial coun-
tries has changed from surplus to deficit. Without
question, the change in the U.S. current account
balance overwhelms changes in other countries.
Second, developing countries, most notably China,
are exporting capital to the industrial countries;
this capital flow, of course, is the counterpart of
the current account deficits of the industrial
countries.
Table 1B provides some geographic detail on
the U.S. current account deficit for 2006. The
United States is running a current account deficit
with every major region of the world. Roughly
half of the deficit can be accounted for by Asia,
with China and Japan being the primary countries.
Meanwhile, Europe accounts for 18 percent of
the deficit.
Overall, Blanchard concludes that private
saving and investment decisions, albeit some-
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European Current Accounts as a Percent of GDP
SOURCE: IMF—World Economic Outlook Database, September 2006.
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Table 1A
Current Account Balances ($ Billions)
Countries 1996 2000 2004 2005
Industrial 35.3 –251.1 –262.9 –477.7
United States –124.9 –416.0 –668.1 –805.0
Japan 65.7 119.6 172.1 163.9
Euro Area 76.9 –41.9 75.2 2.5
France 20.5 18.0 –8.4 –27.6
Germany –14.1 –32.5 101.7 114.8
Italy 40.0 –5.8 –15.1 –26.6
Spain –2.2 –23.2 –55.3 –85.9
Other 17.6 87.2 157.9 160.9
Australia –15.7 –15.2 –40.2 –42.2
Canada 3.4 19.7 22.2 25.0
Switzerland 22.0 30.7 52.4 50.7
United Kingdom –11.4 –37.0 –43.2 –58.1
Developing –76.0 103.8 237.8 450.4
Asia –37.8 46.1 94.7 155.4
China 7.2 20.5 68.7 158.6
Hong Kong –4.0 7.0 15.9 19.0
Korea –23.1 12.3 28.2 16.6
Taiwan 10.9 8.9 18.5 16.4
Thailand –14.4 9.3 6.9 –3.8
Latin America –38.3 –47.0 18.0 30.2
Argentina –6.8 –9.0 3.3 3.3
Brazil –23.5 –24.2 11.7 14.2
Mexico –2.5 –18.6 –7.2 –5.7
Middle East and Africa 9.7 77.2 102.5 211.2
Eastern Europe and –9.6 27.5 22.6 53.6
the former Soviet Union
Statistical Discrepancy 40.7 147.3 25.1 27.3
SOURCE: IMF–World Economic Outlook Database, April 2006.times affected by policies such as capital controls
and reserve accumulation, are driving current
account balances throughout the world.
I want to highlight a demographic explana-
tion. Such an explanation is closely connected
to private saving and investment decisions. While
this explanation is certainly not novel and has
received attention by researchers, I think it merits
increased attention, especially in policy discus-
sions. Similar to the explanations offered above,
a demographic explanation can be only a partial,
though I believe quantitatively important, expla-
nation of the current global pattern of national
current account surpluses/deficits.
There are many reasons that I think a demo-
graphic perspective merits more attention. A
demographic perspective is necessarily a long-
term view, which I think is required for under-
standing the persistence of current account
surpluses and deficits. A demographic perspec-
tive also forces one to think through the underly-
ing general equilibrium process that determines
current account balances across countries.
Many policymakers and economists worry
that the U.S. current account deficit is too large.
Obviously, the U.S. deficit cannot continue to
expand indefinitely, which has led to a literature
on the sustainability of the deficit. How much
larger will these deficits become before they are
reversed and will the reversal be orderly or dis-
ruptive? In my comments today I want to high-
light the potential effects of demographic changes
on contributing to an orderly adjustment.
CHANGING NATIONAL
DEMOGRAPHICS THROUGHOUT
THE WORLD: SOME FACTS
The logical place to begin a demographic
discussion is with some facts about population
growth. World population growth has slowed
and, using recent projections from the United
Nations, it is likely that population growth will
slow further. A notable development is the chang-
ing distribution of population between the so-
called “developed” and “less-developed” nations.
Population growth has been much faster in the
poorer countries than in those with high standards
of living and wealth. Whereas the developed
countries of Europe, North America, Australia
and New Zealand accounted for roughly one-
third of world population in 1900 and about the
same percentage in 1950, by 2000, those countries
accounted for just 20 percent of world population.
It seems likely, however, that the population
growth of many lesser-developed countries will
slow during the present century.
World population has more than doubled in
the last 50 years, and it has nearly quadrupled
since 1900. Currently, world population is grow-
ing at a rate of 1.35 percent per year. The United
Nations’ most recent forecast, however, predicts
a slowing in the growth of world population to
about 0.33 percent per year by 2050, at which time
forecasters are predicting that world population
will total 8.9 billion persons.
While the world’s population growth has
slowed, improvements in life expectancy have
continued. These two conditions are leading to a
rapid aging of the population, which can be seen
in Table 2. A good summary measure of a popu-
lation’s age is the median age—the age such that
half the population is older and half is younger.
Changing World Demographics and Trade Imbalances
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Table 1B
2006 U.S. Current Account Deficit










SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, International Economic Accounts. Release Date
March 14, 2007.Over the past half century, the median age of the
world’s population has increased by 2.8 years,
from 23.6 in 1950 to 26.4 in 2000. The United
Nations forecasts median age to rise to 36.8 years
in 2050. More developed countries are expected
to have an increase in median age from 37.3 years
to 45.2 years, and lesser developed countries from
24.1 years to 35.7 years. Using an estimate for
2005, Japan is the country with the oldest popu-
lation, having a median age of 42.9 years. Japan
is projected to have a median age of 54.9 years in
2050. Similar changes are occurring in Europe.
Italy, with a median age of 42.0 years in 2005, is
projected to have a median age of 50.4 years in
2050. Comparable numbers for selected countries
in Western Europe are: Germany—42.1 and 49.4;
France—38.9 and 44.3; and Belgium—40.3 and
46.2. The United States is not excluded from this
aging; however, the United States remains some-
what younger. The median age of the U.S. popu-
lation, by contrast, is currently 36.0 years, and is
forecast to be 41.1 years in 2050.
China will also be undergoing a substantial
demographic change. China, which has been
experiencing rapid growth and is the world’s
most populous country, must be included in any
discussion stressing demographic change and
trade balances. Between 2005 and 2050, the
median age in China is projected to increase from
32.5 years to 45.0 years. Note that this absolute
change in median age exceeds that of the European
countries that I have highlighted. Moreover, and
remarkably, these projections indicate that in
2050 China’s median population age will be above
that of the United States.
The world’s fastest growing age group is com-
prised of persons 80 years and older. In 2000, 1.1
percent of world population was aged 80 or older.
By 2050, the number aged 80 or older is expected
to be 4.2 percent of world population. In that year,
21 countries or areas are projected to have at least
10 percent of their population aged 80 or over.
Japan is forecast to have 15.4 percent of its popu-
lation aged 80 or more. Italy is projected to have
15.2 percent of its population aged 80 or more.
Most western European countries will have more
than 10 percent of population aged 80 or more.
Germany with 12.3 percent, France with 10.9
percent and Belgium with 10.6 percent are a few
examples. Meanwhile, the United States is pro-
jected to have 7.2 percent of its population made
up of those 80 and older.
The critical point to take away from these
population projections is that today the United
States has a younger population than Europe and
much younger than Japan. By 2050, these gaps
will have grown significantly and even China
will have an older population than the United




The projected demographic changes will have
very significant economic effects, most notably
on economic growth and, thus, on virtually every
economic variable. The connection between
demographic changes and international capital
flows follows directly from the life-cycle theory
of consumption and saving developed by Franco
Modigliani and Richard Brumberg in their 1954
paper (1980). The argument is straightforward.
Young households save relatively little, because
of the expense of child rearing. Middle aged
households save a lot, in anticipation of retire-
ment. Elderly households, no longer working,
draw down assets to pay for their consumption.
These ideas are easily extended to the entire
economy.
When a population can be characterized as
middle aged, then the economy should tend to
have a higher saving rate than when it can be
characterized as elderly. Thus, as the population
of a country moves from middle aged to elderly,
it is reasonable to expect a country’s saving rate
to decrease. Unless the country’s investment rate
moves identically, foreign capital flows and cur-
rent account balances will be affected. Exactly
how depends on the change in investment.
The decline in the number of workers associ-
ated with an aging population tends to depress
investment demand relative to a case of no decline
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE





Median Age 65 or older 80 or older
Country/Area 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050
World 28.0 38.1 7.3 16.2 1.3 4.4
More developed regions 38.6 45.7 15.3 26.1 3.7 9.4
Less developed regions 25.5 36.9 5.5 14.7 0.8 3.6
Least developed countries 19.0 27.9 3.3 6.9 0.4 1.1
Africa 19.0 28.0 3.4 6.9 0.4 1.1
Asia 27.6 40.2 6.4 17.5 1.0 4.5
China 32.5 45.0 7.7 23.7 1.2 7.3
India 23.8 38.6 5.0 14.5 0.7 3.1
Japan 42.9 54.9 19.7 37.7 4.8 15.5
Europe 38.9 47.3 15.9 27.6 3.5 9.6
Austria 40.1 48.0 16.2 29.0 4.3 11.9
Belgium 40.3 46.2 17.3 27.1 4.3 10.7
Denmark 39.5 43.8 15.1 23.9 4.1 9.2
Finland 40.9 44.4 15.9 25.6 4.0 10.0
France 38.9 44.7 16.3 25.9 4.6 10.2
Germany 42.1 49.4 18.8 30.2 4.4 13.1
Greece 40.1 50.1 18.3 31.7 3.5 11.1
Iceland 34.2 44.6 11.7 25.4 3.0 9.6
Ireland 33.4 43.0 11.1 23.4 2.7 6.7
Italy 42.0 50.4 19.7 32.6 5.1 13.3
Luxembourg 38.3 40.4 14.2 19.5 3.2 6.9
Netherlands 39.1 44.2 14.2 25.2 3.6 10.4
Norway 38.0 43.7 14.7 23.8 4.6 9.0
Portugal 39.1 48.8 16.9 30.7 3.7 10.1
Russian Federation 37.3 45.3 13.8 23.8 2.1 5.8
Spain 38.8 49.5 16.8 33.2 4.3 12.2
Sweden 40.2 43.3 17.2 24.1 5.3 9.3
Switzerland 40.1 44.2 15.4 25.0 4.3 11.0
Ukraine 38.9 50.0 16.1 27.6 2.6 7.1
United Kingdom 38.9 43.4 16.1 24.1 4.5 9.2
Latin America/Caribbean 26.0 40.1 6.3 18.5 1.2 5.2
North America 36.3 41.5 12.3 21.5 3.5 7.8
Canada 38.6 45.3 13.1 25.7 3.5 10.0
United States 36.0 41.1 12.3 21.0 3.5 7.6
Oceania 32.3 40.0 10.3 19.4 2.6 6.8
Australia 36.7 43.4 13.1 24.3 3.5 9.3
New Zealand 35.5 44.1 12.2 24.1 3.2 9.2
SOURCE: World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population Database, United Nations Population Division.in workers. The reason is simple. A country with
a declining work force need not replace all its
depreciating capital to maintain its capital stock
per worker. In contrast, a country with a growing
work force must replace depreciating capital and
add to its capital stock to prevent the stock per
worker from falling. Thus, the tendency for saving
to outrun investment in many countries with
slowly growing or declining work forces is per-
fectly sensible and not a sign of imbalance. But
with saving outrunning investment, capital flows
abroad, especially to the United States.1
Eventually, for a country with an aging popula-
tion, the decline in saving will exceed the decline
in investment, which will cause the country’s
current account to decrease. However, it is not
obvious whether aging would immediately cause
investment to fall more or less than saving. It is
possible that domestic investment falls more than
saving initially because of persistence in saving
habits. The key point is that the saving-investment
balances of individual countries can evolve in
complex ways.
This complexity is compounded by the inter-
national dimensions of this issue. The impact of
aging on national saving relative to investment
will not necessarily be the same for every country.
At the global level, the sum of current account
balances must be zero. Thus, what matters is not
the fact of aging for a specific country, but rather




A number of researchers have used a demo-
graphic perspective in their studies of changes
in the current account. I do not have time to pro-
vide a thorough literature review; so, I will limit
myself to articles that are especially relevant to
today’s discussion.
In a recent article, Feroli (2006) simulates a
multi-region overlapping generations model. The
model is calibrated to match the demographic
differences among G-7 countries from 1950-2000.
The demographic differences do explain some of
the long-term capital movements among the G-7
countries. The model predicts that from 2000-2030
the North American members of the G-7, the
United States and Canada, will be net exporters
of savings, while the rest of the G-7 will import
savings. Clearly, Feroli’s model has not correctly
predicted the timing of the change in direction
of the U.S. capital account, given that the capital
flow to the United States continued to grow after
2000. Nevertheless, the model does illustrate a
much deeper level of detail than the analysis I
have outlined here.
Recent work by Nicoletta Batini, Tim Callen
and Warwick McKibbin (2006) also provides a
global view of the impacts of the unfolding demo-
graphic transition. The authors examine the
impacts of the transition for four regions—Japan,
the United States, other industrial countries that
are primarily in Europe and developing countries.
They stress four results. First, population aging
in industrial countries will reduce growth. Not
surprisingly, Japan will experience this effect first.
Second, developing countries will experience
stronger growth over the next 20 to 30 years as
the relative size of their working-age populations
increases. Ultimately, the effects of aging will set
in for those countries also. Third, and most rele-
vant to the current discussion, demographic
change induces changes in saving, investment
and international capital flows. Specifically, the
fastest aging countries—Japan and to a much
lesser extent the other industrial countries—will
likely experience large declines in saving and
current account balances as the elderly support
current consumption by drawing down their
assets. Meanwhile, the United States and develop-
ing countries will experience increases in their
current account balances. Fourth, the authors
1 This point was made by Higgins (1998), who argued that the demographic “center of gravity” for investment demand should occur prior in
the age distribution than for saving. As a result, regions with a relatively higher proportion of their populations in the high saving years should
tend to have saving exceed investment and thus run current account surpluses.
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results are sensitive to assumptions made about
productivity growth and external risk premia.
This point has been made more generally by
David Bloom and David Canning (2004). They
stress that population aging is a new phenome-
non. Consequently, drawing insights from previ-
ous economic history is problematic. Fully
anticipating the myriad of behavioral responses
to the changing economic conditions, some of
which are the result of policy changes, is diffi-
cult to say the least. Consequently, future age-spe-
cific behavior is likely to differ from the past. For
example, longer working lives appear to be
inevitable, but how much longer? Such behav-
ioral responses will translate into effects on sav-
ing and investment and, therefore, on
international capital flows.
The importance of underlying assumptions
has also been made in a recent paper by Charles
Engel and John Rogers (2006). Their analysis is
focused on the U.S. current account deficit, but
they do not stress demographic factors. In their
model, the U.S. current account balance is deter-
mined by the expected discounted present value
of its future share of world gross domestic prod-
uct relative to its current share of world gross
domestic product. Using what they view are rea-
sonable assumptions about U.S. growth relative
to other countries, they conclude that it is possi-
ble to explain the U.S. current account deficit as
the equilibrium outcome of optimal consumption/
saving decisions. Of course, if U.S. growth is not
robust relative to other countries, then another
explanation would be in order to explain the his-
torically large U.S. current account deficit.
DEMOGRAPHICS AND U.S.
SAVING
The low U.S. personal saving rate appears to
be a proximate cause of at least part of the U.S.
current account deficit. The saving rate is the
difference between disposable personal income
and consumption, expressed as a fraction of dis-
posable income. The low saving rate—actually
slightly negative in 2006—does not appear to
reflect abnormal household behavior. A careful
examination of household assets suggests that
consumption has been driven importantly by
gains in asset values, primarily equities and real
estate.2
Why have asset values grown so much in
recent years? Part of the answer has to do with
the surge in U.S. productivity growth since 1995.
But another part is that real interest rates in the
world as a whole, and in the United States, appear
to have declined significantly since the late 1990s.
The decline is related to the glut of world saving
relative to investment that Bernanke discussed
in his 2005 speech. Bernanke did not discuss the
origin of the glut, but I believe that demographics
have something to do with it. Many middle-aged
households around the world are in their high
saving years, in anticipation of retirement—the
anticipated rapid aging of the populations in many
countries. And, as I argued above, the need for
capital formation is reduced when labor force
growth is low. Thus, in an aging population saving
tends to outrun investment, at least for a while.
The U.S. population is aging also, of course, but
at a slower rate than in many other countries.
Thus, differential demographics are central to
differential current accounts.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
It is generally recognized that the world is
undergoing a major demographic transition.
Population growth is slowing and the age struc-
ture of the population is changing, with the shares
of the young declining and the elderly increasing.
Assessing the precise implications is complicated
by the fact that different countries are at different
stages of this demographic transition. It is also
important to recognize that the scenarios I have
Changing World Demographics and Trade Imbalances
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2 The analysis supporting this point can be found in my speech, “U.S. Saving,” which was given in Omaha, Nebraska, at the CFA Society of
Nebraska on February 15, 2007. See www.stlouisfed.org/news/speeches/2007/pdf/2-15.pdf.highlighted above are not precise forecasts, but
rather are attempts to isolate some key impacts
of the demographic changes. It is reasonable to
expect that these demographic changes will cause
policy changes that will produce changes in work-
ing, saving and investment behaviors that are
not fully captured in the existing models.
To the extent that this analysis is correct,
differential rates of aging across countries are
responsible, in part anyway, for the patterns of
current account deficits and surpluses we observe.
These deficits and surpluses may be desirable
outcomes of optimizing behavior rather than
imbalances. We should not interfere with a
process that is allowing the global economy to
cope in an efficient manner with the changing
demographics.
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